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Abstract
Background: Pay-for-performance (P4P) is one of the primary tools used to support healthcare delivery reform.
Substantial heterogeneity exists in the development and implementation of P4P in health care and its effects. This
paper summarizes evidence, obtained from studies published between January 1990 and July 2009, concerning
P4P effects, as well as evidence on the impact of design choices and contextual mediators on these effects. Effect
domains include clinical effectiveness, access and equity, coordination and continuity, patient-centeredness, and
cost-effectiveness.
Methods: The systematic review made use of electronic database searching, reference screening, forward citation
tracking and expert consultation. The following databases were searched: Cochrane Library, EconLit, Embase,
Medline, PsychINFO, and Web of Science. Studies that evaluate P4P effects in primary care or acute hospital care
medicine were included. Papers concerning other target groups or settings, having no empirical evaluation design
or not complying with the P4P definition were excluded. According to study design nine validated quality
appraisal tools and reporting statements were applied. Data were extracted and summarized into evidence tables
independently by two reviewers.
Results: One hundred twenty-eight evaluation studies provide a large body of evidence -to be interpreted with
caution- concerning the effects of P4P on clinical effectiveness and equity of care. However, less evidence on the
impact on coordination, continuity, patient-centeredness and cost-effectiveness was found. P4P effects can be
judged to be encouraging or disappointing, depending on the primary mission of the P4P program: supporting
minimal quality standards and/or boosting quality improvement. Moreover, the effects of P4P interventions varied
according to design choices and characteristics of the context in which it was introduced.
Future P4P programs should (1) select and define P4P targets on the basis of baseline room for improvement, (2)
make use of process and (intermediary) outcome indicators as target measures, (3) involve stakeholders and com-
municate information about the programs thoroughly and directly, (4) implement a uniform P4P design across
payers, (5) focus on both quality improvement and achievement, and (6) distribute incentives to the individual
and/or team level.
Conclusions: P4P programs result in the full spectrum of possible effects for specific targets, from absent or
negligible to strongly beneficial. Based on the evidence the review has provided further indications on how effect
findings are likely to relate to P4P design choices and context. The provided best practice hypotheses should be
tested in future research.
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Research into the quality of health care has produced
evidence of widespread deficits, even in countries with
extensive resources for healthcare delivery[1-4]. One
intervention to support quality improvement is to
directly relate a proportion of the remuneration of pro-
viders to the achieved result on quality indicators. This
mechanism is known as pay-for-performance (P4P).
Although ‘performance’ is a broad concept that also
includes efficiency metrics, P4P focuses on clinical effec-
tiveness measures as a minimum, in any possible combi-
nation with other quality domains. Programs with a
single focus on efficiency or productivity are not covered
by the P4P concept as it is commonly applied.
Current P4P programs are heterogeneous with regard
to the type of incentive, the targeted healthcare provi-
ders, the criteria for quality, etc. Several literature
reviews have been published on the effects of P4P and
on what works and what does not. In the summer of
2009, a meta-review performed in preparation for this
paper identified 16 relevant reviews of sufficient metho-
dological quality, according to Cochrane guidelines
[5-20]. However, several new studies have been pub-
lished in the last five years, which were not addressed.
Previous reviews concluded that the evidence is mixed
with regard to P4P effectiveness, often finding a lack of
impact or inconsistent effects. Existing reviews also
reported a lack of evidence on the incidence of unin-
tended consequences of P4P. Despite this, new pro-
grams continue to be developed around the world at an
accelerated rate. This uninformed course risks produ-
cing a suboptimal level of health gain and/or wasting
highly needed financial resources.
This paper presents the results of a systematic review
of P4P effects and requisite conditions based on peer-
reviewed evidence published prior to July 2009. The set-
tings examined are medical practice in primary care and
hospital care. The objectives are: (1) to provide an over-
view of how P4P affects clinical effectiveness, access and
equity, coordination and continuity, patient-centered-
ness, and cost-effectiveness; (2) to summarize evidence-
based insights about how such P4P effects are affected
by the design choices made during the P4P design,
implementation and evaluation process; and (3) to ana-
lyze the mediating effect on P4P effects stemming from
the context in which a P4P program is introduced. Con-
textual mediators under review include healthcare sys-
tem, payer, provider and patient characteristics.
Methods
Figure 1 presents a flow chart of the methods used.
Detailed information on all methodological steps can be
consulted in Additional file 1. Two reviewers (DDS and
PVH) independently searched for pertinent published
studies, applied the inclusion and exclusion criteria to
the retrieved studies, and performed quality appraisal
analyses. In case of non-corresponding results, consen-
sus was sought by consulting a third reviewer (RR).
Comparison of the analysis results of the two reviewers
identified 18 non-corresponding primary publications
out of 5718 potentially relevant primary publications
(Cohen’s Kappa: 99.7%). As with previous reviews, we
did not perform a meta-analysis because the selected
studies had a high level of clinical heterogeneity[14].
Medline, EMBASE, the Cochrane Library, Web of
Science, PsychINFO, and EconLit were searched. The
concepts of quality of care, financial incentive, and a pri-
mary or acute hospital care setting were combined into
a standardized search string using MeSH and non-
MeSH entry terms. We limited our electronic database
search to relevant studies of sufficient quality published
from 2004 to 2009 or from 2005 to 2009, based on the
database period covered inp r e v i o u sr e v i e w s .T h e s e
reviews and all references of relevant publications were
screened and forward citation tracking was applied with-
out any time restriction. More than 60 international
experts were asked to provide additional relevant
publications.
The inclusion and exclusion criteria applied in the
present review are described in Table 1.
To evaluate the study designs reported in the relevant
P4P papers, we composed an appraisal tool based on
nine validated appraisal tools and reporting statements:
two had generic applicability,[21,22] three examined
RCT design studies,[23-25] one examined cluster RCT
design studies,[26] one examined interrupted time-series
design studies,[27] three examined observational cohort
studies,[24,28,29] and one examined cross-sectional stu-
dies[29].
For all relevant studies, we appraised ten generic
items: clear description of research question, patient
population and setting, intervention, comparison, effects,
design, sample size, statistics, generalizability, and the
addressing of confounders. If applicable, we also
appraised four design-specific items: randomization,
blinding, clustering effect, and number of data collection
points. Modeling and cost-effectiveness studies were
appraised according to guidelines from the Belgian Fed-
eral Health Care Knowledge Centre (KCE) and the
International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Out-
comes Research (ISPOR)[30,31].
The following data were extracted and summarized in
evidence tables: citation; country; primary versus hospital
care; health system characteristics; payer characteristics;
provider characteristics; patient characteristics; quality
goals and targets; P4P incentives; implementing and
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d e s i g n ;s a m p l i n g ,r e s p o n s e ,d r o p o u t ;c o m p a r i s o n ;a n a l y -
sis; effectiveness evaluation; access and/or equity evalua-
tion; coordination and/or continuity evaluation; patient-
centeredness evaluation; cost-effectiveness evaluation;
co-interventions; and relationship results with regard to
health system, payer, provider, and patient. An overview
of data extraction is provided in Additional file 2.
Results
The first two sections provide the description of studies
and the overview of effect findings, independent from
design choices and context. Afterwards the latter are
both specifically addressed.
Description of studies
We identified 128 relevant evaluation studies of suffi-
cient quality, of which 79 studies were not covered in
previous review papers. In the 1990s, only a few studies
were published each year. Since 2000, however, this
number increased to more than 20 studies per annum
in 2007 and 2008, and 18 studies in the first half of
2009. Sixty-three included studies were conducted in
the USA and 57 were conducted in the UK. Two studies
took place in Australia, two in Germany, and two in
Spain. One P4P evaluation study from Argentina and
one from Italy were published. The majority of preven-
tive and acute care results were extracted from studies
performed in the USA. A mixture of countries contribu-
ted to chronic care results. Of the 128 studies, 111 eval-
uated P4P use in a primary care setting, and 30 studies
assessed P4P use in a hospital setting. Thirteen studies
took place in both settings.
Seven study designs can be distinguished based on
randomization, comparison group, and time criteria:
Nine randomized studies were included. Eighteen stu-
dies used a concurrent-historic comparison design with-
out randomization. Three studies used a concurrent
comparison design. Twenty studies were based on an
interrupted time-series design. Nineteen studies used a
Figure 1 Flow chart of search strategy, relevance screening, and quality appraisal.
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sectional design, and eight studies applied economic
modeling.
Effect findings
Clinical effectiveness
The clinical effectiveness of P4P is presented in Addi-
tional file 3, as assessed through randomized, concurrent
plus historical and time-series design studies (47 studies
in total). Thirty nine of these studies, reporting a clinical
effect size, are presented in Additional file 3. It provides
an overview by patient group and P4P target specifica-
tion (type and definition) of the main effect reported
throughout these studies (positive, negative, absent or
contradictory findings) and the range of the effect size
in terms of percentage of change. Five of 39 studies
report effects on non-incentivized quality measures,
next to incentivized P4P targets.
The effects of P4P ranged from negative or absent to
positive (1 to 10%) or very positive (above 10%),
depending on the target and program. Negative results
were found only in a minority of cases: in three studies
on one target, each of which also reported positive
results on other targets [32-34]. It is noteworthy that
‘negative’ in this context means less quality improve-
ment compared to non P4P use and not a quality
decline. In general there was about 5% improvement
due to P4P use, but with a lot of variation, depending
on the measure and program.
For preventive care, we found more conflicting results
for screening targets than immunization targets. Across
the studies, P4P most frequently failed to affect acute
care. In chronic care, diabetes was the condition with
the highest rates of quality improvement due to P4P
implementation. Positive results were also reported for
asthma and smoking cessation. This contrasts with find-
ing no effect with regard to coronary heart disease
(CHD) care. The effect of P4P on non-incentivized qual-
ity measures varied from none to positive. However, one
study reported a declining trend in improvement rate
for non-incentivized measures of asthma and CHD after
a performance plateau was reached[35]. Finally, one
study found positive effects on P4P targets concerning
coronary heart disease, COPD, hypertension and stroke
when applied to non-incentivized medical conditions
(10.9% effect size), suggesting a spillover effect[36]. This
implies a better performance on the same measures as
included in a P4P program, but applied on patient
groups outside off the program.
Access and equity of care
In addition to affecting clinical effectiveness, P4P also
affects the equity of care. The body of evidence support-
ing this finding mainly comes from the UK. In general,
P4P did not have negative effects on patients of certain
age groups, ethnicity, or socio-economic status, or
patients with different comorbid conditions. This finding
is supported by 28 studies with a balanced utilization of
cross sectional, before after, time series and concurrent
Table 1 Definition of inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Participants/Population
Healthcare providers in primary and/or acute hospital care; being a
provider organization (hospital, practice, medical group, etc.); team of
providers or an individual physician
Patients as target group for financial incentives; providers in mental or
behavioral health settings, or in nursing homes
Intervention
The use of an explicit financial positive or negative incentive directly
related to providers’ performance with regard to specifically measured
quality-of-care targets and directed at a person’s income or at further
investment in quality improvement; performance measured as
achievement and/or improvement
The use of implicit financial incentives, which might affect quality of care
but are not specifically intended to explicitly promote quality (e.g., fee-
for-service, capitation, salary); the use of indirect financial incentives that
affect payment only through patient attraction (e.g., public reporting)
Comparison
No inclusion criteria specified for relevance screening No exclusion criteria specified for relevance screening
Outcome
At least one structural, process, or (intermediate) outcome measure on
clinical effectiveness of care, access and/or equity of care, coordination
and/or continuity of care, patient-centeredness, and/or cost-effectiveness
of care
Subjective structural, process, or (intermediate) outcome perceptions or
statements that are not measured quantitatively using a standardized
validated instrument; a single focus on cost containment or productivity
as targets
Design
Primary evaluation studies published in a peer-reviewed journal or
published by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ),
the Institute of Medicine (IOM), the National Health Service Department
of Health or a non-profit independent academic institution
Editorials, perspectives, comments, letters; papers on P4P theory,
development and/or implementation without evaluation
Van Herck et al. BMC Health Services Research 2010, 10:247
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/10/247
Page 4 of 13comparison research designs [37-64]. In fact, throughout
these studies a closing gap has been identified for per-
formance differences. A small difference implicating less
P4P achievement for female as compared to male
patients was found[46,49,60,61]. One should take into
account that no randomized intervention studies have
reported equity of care results.
Coordination and continuity of care
Isolated before-and-after studies lacking control groups
show that directing P4P toward the coordination of care
might have positive effects[65,66]. One time-series study
reported no effect on non-incentivized access and com-
munication measures[35]. This study, however, did
observe a patient self-reported decrease in timely access
to patients’ regular doctors, which might be a negative
spillover effect[35].
Patient Centeredness
With regard to patient-centeredness, two studies–one
Spanish before-and-after study without a control group
and one cross-sectional study in the US–found no and
positive P4P effects, respectively, on patient experience
[67,68]. Another before-and-after study, this one from
Argentina, reported that P4P had no significant effect
on patient satisfaction, due to a ceiling effect[69].
Cost effectiveness
Concerning modeling of health gain, cost, and/or cost-
effectiveness, one study found a short-term 2.5-fold
return on investment for each dollar spent, as a conse-
quence of cost savings[70]. Kahn et al (2006) report on
the Premier project, a hospital P4P program in the US,
not having a sufficient amount of pooled resources ori-
ginating from financial penalties to cover bonus
expenses[71]. Findings for health gain were varied, target
specific, and baseline dependent[72-74]. Cost-effective-
ness of P4P use was confirmed by four studies[75-78].
These few studies vary in methodological quality, but all
report positive effects.
Design choices
We describe the evidence on the effect of P4P design
choices within a quality improvement cycle of (1) quality
goals and targets, (2) quality measurement, (3) P4P
incentives, (4) implementing and communicating the
program, and (5) evaluation. All 128 studies are used as
an input to summarize relevant findings on the effect of
design choices.
(1) Quality goals and targets
With regard to quality goals and targets, process indica-
tors [32,79-81] generally yielded higher improvement
rates than outcome measures,[82-86] with intermediate
outcome measures yielding in-between rates[35,87-90].
Whereas early programs generally addressed one patient
group or focus (e.g. immunization), recent programs
have expanded patient group coverage and the diversity
of targets included. Still, coverage is limited to only up
to ten patient groups, with each time a sub selection of
measurement areas, of all groups and areas a care provi-
der deals with.
Both underuse- and overuse-focused P4P programs
can lead to positive results. However, the latter option
is, at present, scarcely evaluated[57,91]. Study findings
confirmed that the level of baseline performance, which
defines room for improvement, influences program
impact: more room for improvement enables a higher
effect size[92-95]. Even though ceiling effects occur
most often in acute care,[82,96] studies in this area do
not typically consider such effects when selecting targets
as part of P4P development.
Furthermore, studies reporting involvement of stake-
holders in target selection and definition (see for exam-
ple references [79,88,97,98]) seem to have found more
positive P4P effects (above 10% effect size) than those
that don’t.
(2) Quality measurement
With regard to quality measurement, differences in data
collection methods (chart audit, claims data, newly col-
lected data, etc.) did not lead to substantial differences
in P4P results. Both risk adjustment and exception
reporting (all UK studies) seem to support P4P results
when applied as part of the program. Gaming by over
exception reporting and over classifying patients was
kept minimal, although only three studies measured
gaming specifically (e.g., 0.87% of patients exception
reported wrongly)[40,43,85]. Therefore, there is limited
evidence that gaming does occur with P4P use, although
it is not clear what is the incidence of gaming without
P4P use.
(3) P4P incentives
Incentives of a purely positive nature (financial rewards)
[99-105] seem to have generated more positive effects
than incentives based on a competitive approach (in
which there are winners and losers)[33,47,81,85,
92,93,95,104]. This relationship, however, is not straight-
forward and is clouded by the influence of other factors
such as incentive size, level of stakeholder involvement,
e t c .T h eu s eo faf i x e dt h r e s h o l d( s e ef o re x a m p l et h e
UK studies) versus a continuous scale to reward quality
target achievement and/or improvement, are both
options that resulted in positive effects in some studies
(UK) but no or mixed effects in others[80,101,106].
What is clear, however, is that the positive effect was
higher for initially low performers as compared to
already high performers[42,64,81,92,99]. This corre-
sponds to the above-mentioned finding regarding room
for improvement. Furthermore, we found no clear rela-
tionship between incentive size and the reported P4P
results. One study found a strong relationship between
the program adoption rate by physicians and incentive
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also determined by the number of eligible patients per
provider, explained 89 to 95% of the variation in partici-
pation. Several authors in the USA indicated that a
diluting effect for incentive size due to payer fragmenta-
tion likely affected the P4P results[34,100,107]. Dilution
refers to the influence of providers being remunerated
by multiple payers who use different incentive schemes.
This results in smaller P4P patient panels per provider
and lower incentive payments per provider.
With regard to the target unit of the incentive, pro-
grams aimed at the individual provider level
[99,100,102,103,108] and/or team level [79,91,98] gener-
ally reported positive results. The study of Young et al.
(2007)[95] is one exception. Programs aimed at the hos-
pital level were more likely to have a smaller effect
[34,92,104-106,110]. Again, these programs also showed
positive results, but additional efforts seemed to be
required in terms of support generation and/or internal
incentive transfer. One study that examined incentives
at the administrator/leadership level found mixed results
[80]. A combination of incentives aimed at different tar-
get units was rarely used, but did lead to positive results
[93,111].
(4) Implementing and communicating the program
Making new funds available for a P4P program showed
positive effects (e.g. UK studies), while reallocation of
funds generally showed more mixed effects
[32,81,85,92].). However, as the cost-effectiveness results
indicated, in the long-term, continually adding addi-
tional funding is not an option. Balancing the invested
resources with estimated cost savings was applied in one
study, [103] with positive results (2 to 4% effect size).
In the UK, P4P was not introduced in a stepwise fash-
ion. As a result, subsequent nationwide corrections were
required in terms of indicator selection, threshold defi-
nition and the bonus size per target[35,40,42]. Other
countries have used demonstration projects to introduce
P4P. At present, it is too early to tell whether the les-
sons learned from a phased approach will lead to a
higher positive impact of P4P.
There is conflicting evidence for using voluntary ver-
sus mandatory P4P implementation. One study tested
the hypothesis that voluntary schemes lead to overrepre-
sentation of already high performers[98]. These authors
found that each of the tested periods showed selection
bias for only one or two of the eleven indicators tested.
However, another study found significant differences
between participants and non-participants in terms of
hospital size, teaching status, volume of eligible patients,
and mortality rate[85].
Our analysis for the present review identified commu-
nication and participant awareness of the program as
important factors that affect P4P results. Several studies
that found no P4P effects related their findings to an
absent or insufficient awareness of the existence and the
elements of a P4P program[105,106]. With regard to dif-
ferent communication strategies, studies found positive
P4P effects (5 to 20% effect size) with programs that fos-
tered extensive and direct communication with involved
providers[87,97,106,112]. Involving all stakeholders in
P4P program development also had positive effects
(effect size of >10%)[79,88,97,98]. However, findings for
studies examining high stakeholder involvement remain
mixed[83,98].
P4P programs are often part of larger quality improve-
ment initiatives and are therefore combined with other
interventions such as feedback, education, public report-
ing, etc. In the UK (time-series study, 5 to 8% effect
size)[35]; Spain (time-series study, above 30% effect size)
[111]; and Argentina (before-and-after study, 5 to 30%
effect size),[69] This arrangement seems to have rein-
forced the P4P effect, although one cannot be sure due
to the lack of randomized studies with multiple control
groups. In the USA, the impact of combined programs
has been more mixed (mixed study designs, -11 to >30%
effect size)[32-34,75,80,81,83,85,87,88,90,92,93,95,97-
99,101-106,109,110,113-115].
(5) Evaluation
With regard to sustainability of change, there is evi-
dence that a plateau of performance might be reached,
with attenuation of the initial improvement rate[35].
Context findings
We describe the influence of contextual mediators in
terms of (1) healthcare system, (2) payer, (3) provider,
and (4) patient characteristics on the effects of P4P.
(1) Healthcare system characteristics
Nation-level P4P decision making led to more uniform
P4P results (as illustrated by the UK example),
[35,42,64,89,116] whereas more fragmented initiatives
l e dt om o r ev a r i a b l eP 4 Pr e s u l t s( a ss e e ni nt h eU S A )
[32-34,75,80,81,83,85,87,88,90,92,93,95,97-99,101-106,10-
9,110,113-115]. The level of decision making affected
many of the previously described design choices, such as
the level of incentive dilution, the level of incentive
awareness, etc. It is currently not clear how this also
might relate to other healthcare system characteristics
such as type of healthcare purchasing, degree of regula-
tion, etc. although one could assume that such aspects
also modify the level of incentive dilution.
(2) Payer characteristics
Theory predicts that capitation, as a dominant payment
system, is associated with more underuse than overuse
problems, whereas fee-for-service (FFS) is associated
with more overuse than underuse problems [117].
Therefore, as a corrective incentive to complement capi-
tation, P4P should focus more on underuse; and as a
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However, the effects of P4P can be undone by the domi-
nant payment system. A reinforcing effect is expected in
instances in which the goal of both incentive structures
is the same. Supportive evidence concerning these inter-
actions is currently largely absent, due to the frequent
non reporting of dominant payment system characteris-
tics and the lack of overuse focused studies as a com-
parison point.
(3) Provider characteristics
Provider characteristics which might influence P4P
effectiveness include both organizational and personal
aspects. Examples of organizational aspects are leader-
ship, culture, the history of engagement with quality
improvement activities, ownership and size of the orga-
nization. Personal aspects consist of demographics, level
of experience, etc. Individual provider demographics,
experience, and professional background had no or a
moderate effect on P4P performance[40,57,99,103,
105,109,113,118-121]. In the following paragraph the
influence of organizational aspects is described.
Regarding programs in which the provider is either a
team or organization, one study found no relationship
between the role of leadership and P4P performance
[122]. Although another study found no significant asso-
ciation between the nature of the organizational culture
and P4P performance, it did find a positive association
between a patient-centered culture and P4P perfor-
mance[123]. Vina et al. (2009)[122] reported a positive
relationship between P4P performance effects and an
organizational culture that supports the coordination of
care, the perceived pace of change in the organization,
the willingness to try new projects, and a focus on iden-
tifying system errors rather than blaming individuals.
The history of engagement with quality improvement
activities was in one study associated with positive P4P
results[75]. However, another study found no relation-
ship between P4P performance and prior readiness to
meet quality standards[100]. One study found a positive
relationship between P4P performance and a multidisci-
plinary team approach, the use of clinical pathways, and
having adequate human resources for quality improve-
ment projects[122].
Medical groups were likely to perform better than
independent practice associations (IPA)[119,120,
124-126]. Some studies reported a positive relationship
between P4P performance and the age of the group or
the age of the organization[120,127]. In the USA, own-
ership of the organization by a hospital or health plan
was positively related to P4P performance, as compared
to individual provider ownership [119,120,124,127-129].
We encountered conflicting evidence concerning the
influence of the size of an organization in terms of the
number of providers and number of patients. Some
studies reported a positive relationship between the
number of patients and P4P performance[53,119,127,
130-133]. Others reported no relationship [105] or a
negative relationship[37,40,109]. Some studies reported
that group practices performed better on P4P than indi-
vidual practices, [94,105,109] whereas one study
reported the opposite[113].
Mehrotra et al. (2007)[125] found a positive relation-
ship between P4P performance and practices that had
more than the median number of physicians available,
which was 39. Other studies obtained similar results
[43,63,120,124,128,129]. Tahrani et al. (2008)[134]
reported that the performance gap between large versus
small practices in the UK disappeared after P4P imple-
mentation. Previously, small practices performed worse
than large practices.
(4) Patient characteristics
With regard to patient characteristics, there is no avail-
able evidence on how patient awareness of P4P affects
performance. Patient behavior (e.g., lifestyle, coopera-
tion, and therapeutic compliance), however, could affect
P4P results. Again, there is a lack of evidence on this
specific topic, with the exception of P4P programs that
specifically target long-term smoking cessation out-
comes, which is more patient-lifestyle related. Results
show that P4P interventions targeting smoking cessation
outcomes are harder to meet[86]. The effect of other
patient characteristics, such as age, gender, and socio-
economical status, has been described previously (see
P4P effects on equity).
Discussion
This review analyzed published evidence on the effects
of P4P reported in the recent accelerating growth of
P4P literature. Previous reviews identified a lack of stu-
dies, but expected the number to increase rapidly
[5,9,10,12,14,135]. The publication rate as described for
the last 20 years illustrates this evolution. About two
additional years have been covered as compared to pre-
vious reviews [7,13,16,17,136,137]. Seventy nine studies
were not reviewed previously. One factor which likely
contributed to the difference in study retrieval is the
focus of some reviews on only one subset of medical
conditions (e.g. prevention) [16,18,20], on one setting
[13] or one study design [10]. Our review purposely
focused on both primary care and hospital care without
a restriction on medical condition. Furthermore, the dif-
ference in retrieval number is related to the search strat-
egy itself. If one for example omits to include ‘Quality
and Outcomes Framework’ (QOF), one fails to identify
dozens of relevant studies.
The use of multiple study designs to investigate P4P
design, implementation and effects is at present well
accepted in literature [7,9,12,14]. Compared to previous
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studies to summarize contextual relations. As stated by
other authors using similar quality appraisal methods,
the scientific quality of the evidence available is increas-
ing [12]. The vast majority of identified studies was not
randomized (only nine were) and roughly 75 studies were
either cross-sectional or employed a simple before-and-
after design. However, as the evidence-base continues to
grow, conclusions on the effects of P4P can increasingly
be drawn with more certainty, despite the fact that the
scientific quality of current evidence is still poor.
In terms of set up and reporting of P4P programs our
review draws its results from studies showing an evolu-
tion from small scale, often single element, to broader
programs using multidimensional quality measures, as
was previously described [7,135]. Underreporting of key
mediators of a P4P program remains a problem, but has
recently improved for information on incentive size, fre-
quency, etc. Combined with a larger number of studies
this enables a stronger focus on the influence of design
choices and on the context in which P4P results were
obtained.
As is typical for health service and policy interven-
tions, reported effects are nuanced. Magic bullets do not
exist in this arena [5,7,9,12]. However, published results
do show that a number of specific targets may be
improved by P4P when design choices and context are
optimized and aligned. Interpretation of effect size is
dependent on the primary mission of P4P. When it
functions to support uniform minimal standards, P4P
serves its purpose in the majority of studies. If P4P is
intended to boost performance of all providers, its cap-
ability to do so is confirmed for only a number of speci-
fic targets, e.g., in diabetic care.
Negative effects, in terms of less quality improvement
compared to non P4P use, which were first reported in
the review paper by Petersen et al (2006) [14], are rarely
encountered within the 128 studies, but do occur excep-
tionally. Previous authors also questioned the level of
gaming [7,135], and possible neglecting effects on non-
incentivized quality aspects [14,135]. The presence of
limited gaming is confirmed in this review, although it
is only addressed in a minority of studies. Its assessment
is obscured by uncertainty of the level of gaming in a
non P4P context as a comparison point. As the results
show, a few studies included non- incentivized measures
as control variables for possible neglecting effects on
non P4P quality targets. Such effects were absent in
almost all of these studies The results of one study sug-
gest the need to monitor unintended consequences
further and to refine the program more swiftly and fun-
damentally when the target potential becomes saturated
[35]. It is too early to draw firm conclusions about gam-
ing and unintended consequences. However, based on
the evidence, there may be some indications of the
limited occurrence of gaming and a limited neglecting
effect on non-incentivized measures. Positive spillover
effects on non-incentivized medical conditions
are observed in some cases, but need to be explored
further[36].
Equity has not suffered under P4P implementation
and is improving in the UK[37-64]. Cost-effectiveness at
the population level is confirmed by the few studies
available[75-78]. Further attention should be given, both
in practice and research, to how P4P affects other qual-
ity domains, including access, coordination, continuity
and patient-centeredness.
Previous reviews mentioned a few contextual variables
which should be taken into account when running a
P4P program. Examples are the influence of patient
behaviour on target performance [9,10] and the differ-
ence between solo and group practices in P4P perfor-
mance [12]. Our review has further contributed to the
contextual framework from a health system, payer, pro-
vider and patient perspective. Program development and
context findings, which related P4P effects to its design
and implementation within a cyclical approach, enable
us to identify preliminary P4P program recommenda-
tions. As Custers et al (2008) suggested, incentive forms
are dependent on its objectives and contextual charac-
teristics [8]. However, considering the context and goals
of a P4P program, six recommendations are supported
by evidence throughout the 128 studies:
1. Select and define P4P targets based on baseline
room for improvement. This important condition has
been overlooked in many programs, with a clear effect
on results.
2. Make use of process and (intermediary) outcome
indicators as target measures. See also Petersen et al
(2006) and Conrad and Perry (2009), who stress that
some important preconditions, including adequate risk
adjustment, must be fulfilled if outcome indicators are
used [14,136].
3. Involve stakeholders and communicate the program
thoroughly and directly throughout development, imple-
mentation, and evaluation. The importance of awareness
was already stated previously [5,7,12,14].
4. Implement a uniform P4P design across payers. If
not, program effects risk to be diluted [5,6,14,135].
However, one should be cautious for anti-trust issues.
5. Focus on quality improvement and achievement, as
also recommended by Petersen et al (2006) [14]. The
evidence shows that both may be effective when devel-
oped appropriately. A combination of both is most likely
to support acceptance and to direct the incentive to
both low and high performing providers.
6. Distribute incentives at the individual level and/or
at the team level. Previous reviews disagreed on the P4P
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dence on the importance of incentivizing providers indi-
vidually [5,14]. Others questioned this, because of two
arguments: First, the enabling role at a higher (institu-
tional) level which controls the level of support and
resources provided to the individual [9,14]. Secondly,
having a sufficiently large patient panel as a sample size
per target to ensure measurement reliability [136]. Our
review confirms that targeting the individual has gener-
ally better effects than not to do so. A similar observa-
tion was made for incentives provided at a team level.
Statistical objections become obsolete when following a
uniform approach (see recommendation 4).
The following recommendations are theory based but
at present show absent evidence (no. 1) or conflicting
evidence (no. 2 and 3):
1. Timely refocus the programs when goals are ful-
filled, but keep monitoring scores on old targets to see
if achieved results are preserved.
2. Support participation and program effectiveness
by means of a sufficient incentive size. As noted by
other authors, there is an urgent need for further
research on the dose-response relationship in P4P
programs [5,7,9,10,12-14,135,136]. This is especially
important, because although no clear cut relation of
incentive size and effect has been established, many
P4P programs in the US make use of a remarkably
low incentive size (mostly 1 to 2% of income)
[20,135,136]. Conflicting evidence does not justify the
use of any incentive size, while still expecting P4P
programs to deliver results.
3. Provide quality improvement support to partici-
pants through staff, infrastructure, team functioning,
and use of quality improvement tools. See also Conrad
and Perry (2009)[136].
More recent studies, after the time frame of our
review, have confirmed our findings (e.g. to focus on
individual providers as target unit [138]) or provided
new insights. Chung et al (2010) reported in one rando-
mized study that the frequency of P4P payment, quar-
terly versus yearly, does not impact performance[139].
These studies illustrate that a regular update of review-
ing P4P effects and mediators is necessary.
Some limitations apply to the review results. First,
there were restrictions in the search strategy used (e.g.
number of databases consulted). Secondly, although
quality appraisal was performed, and most studies con-
trolled for potential confounders, selection bias cannot
be ruled out with regard to observational findings. How-
ever, an analysis of randomized studies identified the
same effect findings, when assessed on a RCT only
inclusion basis.
Thirdly, publication bias is likely to impact the evi-
dence-base of P4P effectiveness and data quality bias
may make the comparison of results across P4P pro-
grams problematic[140].
Fourthly, behavioural health care and nursing home
care were excluded from the study as potential settings
for P4P application.
Fifthly, the large degree of voluntary participation in
P4P programs might lead to a self selection of higher
performing providers with less room for improvement
(ceiling effect). This could induce an underestimation of
P4P effectiveness in the general population of providers.
Finally, P4P introduces one type of financial incentive,
but does not act in isolation. Other interventions are
often simultaneously introduced alongside a P4P pro-
gram, which might lead to an overestimation of effects.
Furthermore, the fit with non financial and other pay-
ment incentives, each with their own objectives, could
be leveraged in a more coordinated fashion [6,8,12,14].
Current P4P studies only provide some pieces of this
more complex puzzle.
Conclusions
Based on a quickly growing number of studies this
review has confirmed previous findings with regard to
P4P effects, design choices and context. New effect find-
ings include the increasing support for positive equity
and cost effectiveness effects and preliminary indications
of the minimal occurrence of unintended consequences.
The effectiveness of P4P programs implemented to date
is highly variable, from negative (rarely) or absent to
positive or very positive. The review provides further
indications that programs can improve the quality of
care, when optimally designed and aligned with context.
To maximize the probability of success programs should
take into account recommendations such as attention
for baseline room for improvement and targeting at
least the individual provider level.
Future research should address the issues where evi-
dence is absent or conflicting. An unknown dose response
relationship, mediated by other factors, could preclude
many programs from reaching their full potential.
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